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Evaluation of risks of foot-and-mouth disease in 
Scotland to assist with decision making during 
the 2007 outbreak in the UK
V. V. Volkova, P. R. Bessell, M. E. J. Woolhouse, N. J. Savill
An outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) occurred in Surrey on August 3, 2007. A Great 
Britain-wide ban on livestock movements was implemented immediately. This coincided 
with the start of seasonal sheep movements off the hills in Scotland; the majority of these 
animals are sold via markets. The ban therefore posed severe economic and animal-
welfare hardships if it was to last through September and beyond. The Scottish Government 
commissioned an analysis to assess the risk of re-opening markets given the uncertainty 
about whether FMD had entered Scotland. Tracing of livestock moved from within the 
risk zone in England between July 16 and August 3 identified contact chains to 12 Scottish 
premises; veterinary field inspections found a further three unrecorded movements. No 
signs of infection were found on these holdings. Under the conservative assumption that a 
single unknown Scottish holding was infected with FMD, an estimate of the time-dependent 
probability of Scotland being FMD free given no detection was made. Analyses indicated that 
if FMD was not detected by early to mid-September then it was highly probable that Scotland 
was FMD free. Risk maps were produced to visualise the potential spread of FMD across 
Scotland if it was to spread either locally or via market sales.
AN outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in Surrey on August 3, 
2007, which occurred due to the virus escaping from a research facility 
(Spratt 2007), led to an immediate Great Britain-wide ban on livestock 
movements. This posed economic and animal-welfare hardships for 
the Scottish livestock industries as sheep trade in Scotland peaks annu-
ally from mid-August through September (Volkova and others 2008). 
Sheep must be moved off the hills at this time to avoid starvation and 
hypothermia.
On August 13, 2007, the Scottish Government commissioned an 
assessment of the relative risk of resuming sheep sales via markets. Their 
concern was the risk that FMD might be present in Scotland, and would 
spread if livestock movements resume. During the preceding outbreak 
of FMD in Great Britain in 2001, the virus disseminated with livestock 
being moved via markets or to abattoirs, or was carried on the vehicles 
and personnel involved in the movements, followed by local (within 
3 km) spread via multiple conveyors (Gibbens and others 2001). An 
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assessment of freedom of a territory from a reportable livestock disease 
normally involves a purposively designed survey of the host popula-
tion. This option was not available to us for the evaluation of FMD 
in Scotland in 2007 due to the continued economical and animal-wel-
fare pressures with continuation of the livestock movement ban. We 
therefore followed an alternative approach and agreed with the Scottish 
Government that addressing the following four questions would pro-
vide the evidence necessary to assist with their decision-making.
Question 1: Identify direct livestock movements between July 16 
and August 3 from a 20-km risk zone centred around the two FMD-
infected farms and two dangerous contact premises in Surrey into 
Scotland, and into the English counties bordering Scotland. The latter 
was important because of the potential for local disease spread across 
the Scottish border.
Question 2: Perform contact tracing of livestock moved into 
Scotland that may have been exposed to the livestock originating from 
within the risk zone between July 16 and August 3.
Question 3: Estimate the time-dependent probability that Scotland 
was free from FMD given that no FMD was detected.
Question 4: Assess the month-by-month magnitude of contact 
between Scottish markets and farms via sheep movements using the 
movement records for 2006.
T wo further outputs were considered useful to understand the 
potential for dissemination of FMD in Scotland and to prioritise the 
response on the ground should the disease be detected.
Question 5: visualising potential dissemination of FMD via mar-
ket sales of sheep.
Question 6: project potential local-spread of FMD, if any of the 
holdings identified in questions 1 and 2 above were infected.
Materials and methods
Livestock movement records
Animal movement records were extracted from three British live-
stock movement databases: the Scottish Animal Movement System Veterinary Record | July 30, 2011
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holdings that had not yet been examined for signs of disease and had 
not yet manifested the signs after an incubation period.
The posterior probability that Scotland is infected given that no 
FMD has been detected by a certain day is calculated using Bayes’ theo-
rem, where I is the event that a single holding is infected (‘Scotland is 
  infected’), Ic is the event that no holding is infected (‘Scotland is FMD 
free’), and Ut is the event that FMD has not been detected by day t. Then 
the Odds form of Bayes’ theorem states (Lindley 2006):
Odds(I /Ut) = Odds(I) × 
Pr(Ut/I)
Pr(Ut/Ic)
 (1)
where Odds(I) is our prior belief that Scotland is infected at the 
time of implementation of the movement ban, Odds(I/Ut) is our 
updated belief on day t of Scotland being infected given no detection 
of FMD by that day. If there is no infection in Scotland then it cannot, 
of course, be detected, therefore Pr(Ut/Ic)=1. Therefore:
Odds(I /Ut) = Odds(I) × Pr(Ut/I)   (2)
The likelihood Pr(Ut/I), is informed by the time-to-detection analy-
sis described above.
Potential spread via sheep market sales 
(questions 4 and 5)
From the SAMS records, the numbers of farms sending sheep to, and 
receiving sheep from, each Scottish market each month of 2006 were 
(SAMS) and the Animal Movement Licensing System (AMLS) for 
sheep, pig, goat and farmed deer batch movements; and the Cattle 
Tracing System of the British Cattle Movement Service (CTS) for 
individual cattle movements. The SAMS extracts were supplied by 
the Scottish Government, and those from AMLS and CTS by the 
National Emergency Epidemiology Group of the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA).
Movement record analysis for contact tracing 
(questions 1 and 2)
The following computer algorithm was implemented to contact-trace 
animals from within the 20-km risk zone in England into Scotland. 
The three database-extracts were scanned for any movements between 
July 16 and August 3 from that zone to secondary holdings. Any 
movements into Scotland were recorded. The databases were scanned 
a second time for any movement from a secondary holding to a terti-
ary holding that occurred on or after the date of the primary to second-
ary movement. Again, any movements into Scotland were recorded. 
This process was repeated until no further movements were identi-
fied. Only movements of animals between holdings, but not those to 
abattoirs, were considered.
Time-to-detection and probability of disease freedom 
(question 3)
The worst-case scenario was considered to be a case of a single unknown 
Scottish holding harbouring FMD by the time of the implementation 
of the livestock movement ban on midnight of August 3 (having more 
than one infected holding would increase the chance for detection). 
Detection of FMD on such a holding was assumed to occur if the ani-
mals were moved under licence to abattoir or on welfare grounds; moved 
within the same business (8-km business zone); or if they became symp-
tomatic after an incubation period. In those three movement-associated 
detection situations, the animals would be examined for signs of FMD. 
We therefore assumed that FMD would be detected in the movement-
associated examination of animals moving off the infected holding. 
Incubation period was defined as the maximum time from effective 
exposure to FMD virus to the clinical manifestation of disease in the 
animals, with the exposure occurring at the time of the implementation 
of the movement ban. Worst-case scenario incubation periods of two 
and three weeks on a holding with no movement-associated inspection 
of animals were considered for a holding with cattle or pigs, and two, 
four and six weeks for a sheep-only holding.
Holdings with individual livestock species would go through the 
three movement-associated detection situations at different rates; 
this was explicitly specified in the analysis as follows: the numbers 
of holdings with each livestock species were obtained from publicly 
available results of the agricultural census of Scotland in June 2006, 
the Scottish Government supplied the numbers of Scottish sheep, 
cattle and pig holdings sending animals to Scottish abattoirs under 
licence weekly after August 8, when such moves started and they 
also provided the number of holdings issued with licences for animal 
movements on welfare grounds by August 21. In terms of move-
ments within the same business (8-km business zone), the Scottish 
Government estimated that from August 20 to 25 there were 1200 
such movements on sheep-only holdings and 1200 such movements 
on holdings with other livestock. Thereafter, roughly 10 per cent of 
all livestock holdings moved animals within 8-km business zones per 
week. The 15 holdings identified by contact tracing (see above) were 
modelled explicitly using the dates of the veterinary inspections on 
these holdings. These holdings were classified as a sheep-only holding 
if the traced in-movement was sheep, and as a cattle holding if the 
traced in-movement was cattle.
The time-to-detection analysis was performed using PROC 
LIFETEST procedure in SAS® 9.1 software for Windows (SAS 
Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA). The product-limit estimate (also called 
Kaplan-Meier estimate, non-parametric maximum likelihood esti-
mate) of the survival function was used. The survival function evalu-
ated the chances for a farm in Scotland exposed to FMD by the time of 
implementation of the movement ban to remain undetected beyond a 
given date. In other words, we estimated the probability of not having 
detected FMD in Scotland by a certain date as the proportion of total 
FIG 1: Distribution 
of sheep 
movements to 
the Scottish 
farms from (a) a 
northern market, 
(b) a southern 
market and (c) the 
Kelso ram sale 
during August and 
September 2006
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plotted (data not shown). Potential dissemination of FMD via market 
sales of sheep was visualised by mapping the spatial distributions of 
the sheep movements to the farms from several major sales, including 
the Kelso ram sale, held in August and September of 2006. A small 
amount of error was introduced into coordinates of the receiving farms 
in the map in order to prevent identification of individual holdings.
Potential local-spread (question 6)
The map of the potential local-spread of FMD in Scotland was based on 
an a priori developed logistic regression model of holding-level suscep-
tibility to FMD infection via local-spread parameterised from the UK’s 
FMD 2001 outbreak data (Bessell and others 2008, 2010, Bessell 2009). 
The model included four sets of predictors for a holding: the distance to a 
source of infection (that is, seed, defined for the 2001 epidemic as a hold-
ing infected before the national movement ban, and defined here as a 
holding implicated by the contact tracing), species farmed, geographical 
size and the numbers of livestock in the surrounding area. The predicted 
probabilities of the infection for all farms in Scotland were calculated. 
Using these data points a raster map was derived based upon the sum of 
these values within 3 km of each cell in a 100 x 100 m2 cell size grid. The 
map was produced with ArcView® 9.2 (ESRI, Redlands, CA, USA).
Results
Contact tracing
Contact tracing did not identify any direct movements of livestock 
onto Scottish holdings from the 20-km risk zone in England between 
July 16 and August 3. T welve holdings in Scotland were identified as 
being at risk of FMD due to potential indirect contacts. In particular, 
six sheep were moved on July 21 from a single holding within the risk 
zone to a Welsh showground. Five days later, sheep were moved from 
this showground, either directly or indirectly via a market, onto five 
holdings in Scotland. Whether they were the same sheep was impos-
sible to tell because sheep movements are recorded in batches in the 
AMLS and SAMS databases.
For cattle movement, four potential contact chains were identi-
fied. They originated in the risk zone on July 16 and 20 and resulted 
in 110 animals moving onto six holdings in Scotland on August 1, and 
one animal moving onto another holding on August 2. None of these 
cattle were from the risk zone; this could be determined because CTS 
records the movements of individual cattle identified by their passport-
numbers. No potential contact chains into Scotland via movements of 
pigs, goats or farm deer were identified.
No signs of infection were found on these 12 Scottish holdings 
by veterinary field inspections. While carrying out their inspections, 
the veterinarians identified a further three unrecorded movements to 
other holdings. These holdings were also inspected with no signs of 
infection.
Contact tracing into English counties bordering Scotland identi-
fied 35 holdings potentially at risk. No field inspections were carried 
out on these holdings.
Potential spread via sheep market sales
The number of farms receiving sheep from a single Scottish market dur-
ing a month in 2006 ranged from one to over 800. The total number of 
sales to the farms was at its highest from August to November. Because 
of these numerous contacts between the markets and farms, opening 
Scottish markets for sheep trade during this period poses a relatively 
high risk of spreading FMD, if present, to multiple farms.
The spatial distributions of the sheep movements to Scottish 
farms from a northern market, a southern market and the Kelso ram 
sale during August and September 2006 are shown in Fig 1. From 180 
to 850 farms received sheep from each of these markets. The median 
distance the sheep travelled was 43 km (mean=72.5 km), however, 
the distance travelled varied from 1 to 558 km, with an interquartile 
range of 78 km. Clearly, opening Scottish markets for trade during 
August and September poses a high risk of wide geographical spread 
of FMD if present in sheep in Scotland.
Potential local-spread
Assuming that 14 of the 15 at-risk holdings in Scotland (coordinates 
were not available for the other one), and the 35 contact-traced English 
border county holdings are all infected with FMD, Fig 2 shows the col-
our-coded representation of the expected number of holdings within 
3 km of each of these holdings that would become infected via local-
spread given a similar outbreak progression, disease control strategies, 
and virus characteristics as in 2001.
Time-to-detection and probability of disease freedom
The analysis indicates that the probability for a single FMD-infected 
livestock holding in Scotland remaining undetected dropped from 100 
per cent on August 6, to lower than 50 per cent by August 21 under 
all of the scenarios of incubation periods (solid black lines, Fig 3). The 
probability dropped below 10 per cent in all scenarios by the second 
week of September. The duration of the incubation period on sheep-
only holdings had a marked effect on how rapidly the probability of 
FMD not being detected declined.
Discussion
Contact tracing of livestock, based on record-collating systems such 
as CTS, AMLS and SAMS, was very useful for the early prioritisation 
of surveillance effort in Scotland following the detection of FMD in 
Surrey. This was because it was possible to direct the veterinary inspec-
tions only on the holdings at risk. However, the AMLS and SAMS 
databases record livestock movements as a batch, not at an individual 
level. This limited the ability to distinguish the movements of sheep 
from the risk zone into Scotland from the potential-exposure contact 
chains. Development of AMLS and SAMS systems to record move-
ments of individual animals, based on animal passports (similarly to 
that done in CTS for cattle), will improve the resolution of surveillance 
based on these systems, thereby allowing more efficient deployment 
of resources during an infectious disease outbreak. We also observed 
that delayed reporting of livestock movements by animal keepers, long 
processing times required for the resulting large datasets, and unknown 
frequency of undisclosed movements limited the utility of the records 
collated by the British livestock movement databases.
FIG 2: Risk map of potential foot-and-mouth disease local-spread 
in Scotland if 14 of 15 at-risk holdings in Scotland and 35 such 
holdings in North England were infected
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The local-spread risk map outlined the regions in immediate need 
of follow-up measures should FMD be detected on an at-risk holding, 
and was prepared to stand-by. The ability to forecast the risks is condi-
tional on the availability of the modelling tools, the up-to-date data on 
livestock demographics to feed into the models, and qualified profes-
sionals able to timely deliver the evidence to decision makers.
Infection of a sheep-only holding appears to pose the greatest 
risk of FMD remaining undetected in Scotland. This, however, 
depends on the length of incubation period, and on how often and 
how thoroughly the animals are inspected. For a given incubation 
period, the time-to-detection may be shorter during the periods 
of the year when a larger fraction of farms are moving sheep to 
abattoirs, off the hills or otherwise within business zones. At these 
times, not only the risk of spread but also the likelihood of disease 
detection is at its highest.
Our belief in whether FMD is in Scotland given that it has not 
been detected by a certain date depends on our prior belief (informed 
by other sources of information and our knowledge of FMD epide-
miology) that FMD got into Scotland before the Great Britain-wide 
ban on livestock movement. Three scenarios are shown in Fig 3 using 
odds as a measure of belief. As Equation 2 demonstrates, our posterior 
odds on FMD being in Scotland given that it has not been detected by 
a certain date is just the probability of not detecting FMD by that date 
scaled by our prior odds. As more evidence accumulates that FMD is 
not in Scotland (that is, as time passes and it is not detected) our belief 
that FMD is in Scotland falls. How quickly that falls depends on our 
prior odds. The more we believe FMD got into Scotland before the 
movement ban, the more evidence we need to convince ourselves that 
Scotland is FMD free. Or, equivalently, on a certain day postmove-
ment ban, we are more likely to believe that Scotland is FMD free 
than someone else if our belief that FMD got into Scotland premove-
ment ban was lower than theirs.
Time-to-detection of FMD was analysed assuming that any live-
stock moved (to slaughter, for welfare reasons or within the business) 
was inspected for signs of FMD, and that the inspection would detect 
FMD in at least one animal if the holding was infected. Although the 
former may have been a reasonable assumption due to the alert state of 
the industry, the latter, though, may have been an overestimate because 
detecting signs of FMD in sheep is difficult. However, we did consider 
the worst-case scenario of a sin-
gle infected holding. If FMD had 
been introduced onto, or spread, 
to more than one holding pre- or 
postmovement ban this would 
increase the chances for detec-
tion. Therefore the quantitative 
results of the time-to-detection 
analysis should not be interpreted 
literally. Indeed, they were not. 
Instead, they were used to aid in 
decision-making together with 
the other evidence available.
Understanding the prob-
ability of undetected FMD in 
Scotland, and how this was influ-
enced by a priori personal beliefs, 
helped decision makers to judge 
the degree of risk. This was, of 
course, considered against the 
economic and animal-welfare 
consequences of prolonging the 
movement ban. The results of 
this evaluation of risks were used 
by the Scottish Government 
for negotiating with national 
stakeholders and the European 
Commission. Livestock markets 
in Scotland were   re-opened on 
August 23, 2007 (Scudamore and Ross 2008).
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FIG 3: Probability of not detecting foot and mouth disease (FMD) over time given the worst-case 
scenario of a single infected holding somewhere in Scotland (black solid lines). Posterior belief, in 
terms of odds, that there is an infected holding in Scotland given no detection over time for prior odds 
of 1:2 (dotted red lines), 1:1 (solid black lines) and 2:1 (dashed green lines) of FMD present in Scotland 
at the time of the implementation of the movement ban. (a) Incubation period of two weeks for all 
holding types. (b) Incubation period of three weeks for cattle and mixed holdings and four weeks for 
sheep-only holdings. (c) Incubation period of three weeks for cattle and mixed holdings and six weeks 
for sheep-only holdings.
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